More simply, the chief missions of
SPETSNAZ are reconnaissance and sabotage. The missions of punitive action and
forming insurgent groups are holdovers from World War II. Currently, the only
insurgent training conducted by SPETSNAZ consists of advisory efforts in Africa
and possibly Cuba. Soviet emphasis on a short war probably precludes any serious
plans to organize partisan detachments in Western Europe in the event of war.
SPETSNAZ operate up to 1000
kilometers behind enemy lines, with emphasis on enemy nuclear delivery means,
either locating them for attack by other forces or, if necessary, attacking by
themselves. Typical SPETSNAZ targets include mobile missiles, command and
control facilities, air defenses, airfields, port facilities, and lines of
communication. In addition, specially trained SPETSNAZ elements have the
missions of assassinating or kidnapping enemy military and civilian
leaders.
The basic SPETSNAZ unit is a team of
eight to ten men. The team is commanded by an officer, may have a warrant
officer or senior sergeant as deputy, and includes a radio operator, demolitions
experts, snipers, and reconnaissance specialists. Team members have some degree
of cross-training so a mission can continue if a specialist is lost.
Each Soviet front or fleet
would have a brigade with a wartime strength of up to 1300 men and capable of
deploying about 100 teams. A SPETSNAZ brigade consists of three to five SPETSNAZ
battalions, a signal company, support units, and a headquarters company
containing highly skilled professional soldiers responsible for carrying out
assassinations, kidnappings, and contact with agents in the enemy rear area. The
organization of a naval SPETSNAZ brigade reflects its emphasis on sea
infiltration, with up to three frogman battalions, one parachute battalion, and
a minisubmarine battalion, as well as the signal company, headquarters company,
and support elements. Many Soviet armies have SPETSNAZ companies of 115 men and
can deploy up to 15 teams. The companies are organized similarly, with three
SPETSNAZ platoons, a communications platoon, and supporting units. Besides the
SPETSNAZ units at front and army, there are additional ones directly
subordinate to the GRU.1 Total Soviet SPETSNAZ strength in peacetime
is about 15,000.2
There are stringent standards required of all conscripts assigned to SPETSNAZ.
Potential reydoviki must be secondary school graduates, intelligent,
physically fit, and, perhaps most important, politically reliable. Parachute
training with a paramilitary youth organization is naturally a plus. Upon
induction, a SPETSNAZ conscript will be asked to sign a loyalty oath in which he
acknowledges death will be his punishment for divulging details about his
service.
After induction, some of the
conscripts will be selected for an arduous, six-month-long noncommissioned
officers school. Anticipating a high washout rate, commanders may send as many
as five conscripts for each available NCO slot. In the event more NCOs graduate
than there are slots available, the lower ranked graduates are assigned to
positions as private soldiers. This excess of trained NCOs provides a ready pool
of leaders to replace casualties in the field.3 Washouts and those
conscripts not selected for NCO school receive training in their units. In
addition to basic military training, they will be trained in the following
specialized skills:
Training in foreign language, etc.,
is geared to the SPETSNAZ unit's wartime target area. The team leader is
expected to be nearly fluent in one of the languages of a target country, while
enlisted personnel are expected to know the alphabet and basic phrases. This
specific training relating to a foreign country is intended not only to
facilitate operations there but also to enable the teams to conduct missions
while wearing enemy uniforms or civilian clothing.
Parachute training begins with
static line jumps, but many soldiers will progress to high altitude low opening
(HALO) jumps using steerable parachutes. Jumps are made day and night, in all
kinds of terrain and weather.4
The technical training schedule
leaves time for rigorous physical training involving obstacle courses and forced
marches, which are often conducted in gas masks. Some units also provide
strenuous adventure training like mountain climbing and skiing. Up to half the
year is spent training out of garrison. Once or twice a year, selected teams
engage in extremely realistic exercises carried out under battle conditions.
Teams are provided little in the way of rations and are forced to forage for
food. Exercise objectives are often operational installations guarded by regular
troops or soldiers of the Ministry of Interior.
Further indications of the realism
of SPETSNAZ training are elaborate brigade training areas containing full-scale
mockups of enemy weapon systems and facilities. Brigades opposite NATO typically
have models of Lance, Pershing, and, ground-launched cruise missiles, as well as
airfields, nuclear storage sites, air defense sites, and communications
facilities. These mockups are used for both equipment familiarization and
demolition training.5
SPETSNAZ careerists are well
compensated for the strenuous training. Each year of service with a SPETSNAZ
unit counts as one and one-half years for pension purposes, and there is an
incentive pay of 50 percent of salary.6 As in other types of airborne
units, SPETSNAZ receive jump pay, which varies with the total number of jumps,
e.g., the fiftieth jump pays more than the fifth. A conscript's jump pay can
exceed his regular salary.
In keeping with their
behind-the-lines missions, SPETSNAZ are lightly equipped. Each soldier will have
an AK-74 assault rifle or SVD sniper rifle, a silenced 9-mm pistol, ammunition,
a knife, up to eight hand grenades of various types, and rations. In addition,
every team member carries a portion of the team's gear, which will normally
include an RPG-16 grenade launcher and rounds, an R-350M burst transmission
radio capable of communicating over a range of 1000 kilometers, directional
mines, and plastic explosives. If the mission demands it, the team can also be
assigned special weapons such as the SA-7 or SA-14 surface-to-air missile. The
load per team member is approximately 40 kilograms (88 pounds).
Provisions of up-to-date
intelligence is critical to the success of SPETSNAZ missions. The second
directorate of the front staff is responsible for intelligence. It
includes separate departments for reconnaissance, agent intelligence, signals
intelligence, information processing, and SPETSNAZ. Under the SPETSNAZ
department are both the SPETSNAZ brigade and a dedicated SPETSNAZ intelligence
unit.7 The latter is tasked with recruitment of "sleeper"
sabotage agents and peacetime collection of information on potential targets and
enemy military personnel.
SPETSNAZ sabotage agents are rare in
comparison to ordinary intelligence agents. A sleeper might have no other
mission than to wait for the order to commit sabotage in preparation for war. He
might also be tasked to acquire safehouses to support the eventual deployment of
SPETSNAZ teams. Besides the sleepers, the SPETSNAZ intelligence unit controls
legal and illegal agents for collection of information. Potential SPETSNAZ
agents include attachés, soldiers aboard ships on trips to the West, and truck
drivers crossing international borders. There is a European customs agreement
that allows trucks marked "T.I.R." (Transports Internationaux
Routiers) to cross borders with minimum customs formalities. These
vehicles can (and do) travel near sensitive installations and through areas off
limits to formally accredited military personnel.8 Information is
also exchanged with the agent intelligence department. Thus, intensive peacetime
collection efforts probably keep SPETSNAZ target folders full.
The SPETSNAZ agent network will be
particularly important in the days immediately preceding hostilities. As
tensions rise, the professionals of the headquarters companies will infiltrate
enemy territory, often through legal entry points with false papers or as
members of Soviet legations. They will contact in-place agents if necessary and
prepare for the arrival of the ordinary SPETSNAZ teams.
The majority of SPETSNAZ teams will
infiltrate by fixed-wing Aeroflot aircraft once hostilities have begun, using
Soviet offensive air operations as cover. Once in the target area, the teams
will bury their parachutes and organize a base. Routes into the base camp will
be booby-trapped to provide warning of discovery, and the location of the base
camp will be shifted periodically.9 If the mission demands mobility,
SPETSNAZ will steal enemy vehicles or use transportation acquired by the agent
network.
Most SPETSNAZ missions will have the
primary objective of reconnaissance, so they will use camouflage to avoid
contact with enemy patrols. They will attack if ordered to do so by the brigade
or in the event a nuclear missile is ready for firing. In that case, the team
will try to destroy the missile by fire and, if not successful, will mount an
all-out attack. As a general rule, SPETSNAZ commanders operate independently.
Once missions are given to the teams, army and front headquarters keep
interference to a minimum, relying on the initiative and skill of the team
leaders. Sufficient coordination is maintained to be able to order the teams out
of the way of other Soviet attacks, particularly nuclear strikes.10
SPETSNAZ are not particularly well
known within the Soviet military, and they tend not to publicize their existence
and capabilities. Their uniforms are not distinctive, with ground forces
SPETSNAZ usually wearing airborne or signal troops' uniforms and naval SPETSNAZ
wearing naval infantry or submariners' uniforms. Their ethnic makeup is likewise
not distinctive and to some degree reflects the ethnic characteristics of the
intended target. For example, SPETSNAZ units in the Far East are alleged to have
available North Koreans and Japanese from Manchuria and the Kuril Islands.11
There were special purpose groups in
World War II whose primary mission was to parachute into an area and form the
nucleus of a partisan group to be fleshed out with area residents.12 SPETSNAZ
as we know them today were probably not formed until the midsixties, perhaps as
a response to increased U.S. emphasis on unconventional warfare, exemplified by
President Kennedy's support for the U.S. Army Special Forces. Some insight into
SPETSNAZ capabilities can be gained from reviewing reported past actions.
In the late sixties, four-man
SPETSNAZ teams were clandestinely inserted into Vietnam to test the then-new SVD
sniper rifle in combat.13 In May 1968, a reconnaissance-sabotage
group attached to the 103d Guards Airborne Division seized Prague Airport to
enable the division to land. Prior to the operation, the officers and men were
familiarized with the airport and its defenses. They embarked on a plane that
received permission to land at Prague based on a fictitious claim of engine
trouble. As the aircraft touched down and slowed, they jumped out, seized guard
posts, and helped to set up a control team to bring in the division.14
In December 1979, SPETSNAZ, in
company with the Committee for State Security (KGB), surrounded President
Hafizullah Amin's palace in Kabul, Afghanistan, and proceeded to execute Amin
and virtually everyone in the palace. In the words of an Afghan survivor,
"the SPETSNAZ used weapons equipped with silencers and shot down their
adversaries like professional killers."15 After this, the
SPETSNAZ secured Kabul Airport in preparation for the mass airlanding of
airborne troops. Subsequent operations in Afghanistan have included attempts to
ambush the rebel leader Ahmed Shah Massoud, infiltration of rebel-held
territory, and heliborne ambushes of rebel units.16
There was midget submarine activity
within territorial waters in October 1982 in Sweden and in August 1983 in Japan.
The midget submarines probably belonged to naval SPETSNAZ and may have been
delivered to the target area by specially equipped India-class submarines.
Discovery of tracks from the submarines also coincided with reports of unknown
divers appearing on shore, leading to speculation that SPETSNAZ were conducting
penetration exercises in foreign countries.17 The true reasons for
this activity may never be known, but the boldness of the operations had the
undeniable effect of enhancing the reputation of SPETSNAZ.
One must be on guard in concluding
from the more extreme articles in the open press that the average SPETSNAZ
soldier is ten-feet tall. Despite their qualifications, tough training, and
demonstrated value, the fact remains that the majority of SPETSNAZ are
conscripts on two-year tours of duty. Consequently, there is limited opportunity
for cross-training in specialties, and soldiers may lack the degree of
motivation that characterizes Western unconventional warfare forces, such as the
U.S. Army Rangers, Special Forces, and the British Special Air Service. In
comparison to Western unconventional warfare forces, SPETSNAZ lack specialized
infiltration aircraft such as the U.S. Air Force MC-130E Combat Talon. This lack
severely limits SPETSNAZ capabilities for clandestine insertion, particularly
prior to the start of hostilities. As a result, SPETSNAZ must rely on the brute
force of the Soviet air operation to cover most infiltration. If Soviet
fighter-bombers and other means do not inflict the necessary damage to NATO air
defenses, unarmed transports could prove sitting ducks, with the result of heavy
SPETSNAZ losses before teams arrive on target.
Despite these limitations, SPETSNAZ
pose a formidable wartime threat to NATO's rear area. From the Soviet side, a
force of several thousand highly trained soldiers is a small investment with the
potential layoff of neutralizing NATO's nuclear delivery capability and
degrading air defense and communications systems, not merely through the efforts
of SPETSNAZ, but by enhancing the effectiveness of aircraft, missiles, and
ground forces through accurate target location. The size and quality of the
SPETSNAZ establishment point out the need for good security of key
installations, a fact that is increasingly taken to heart by Western planners.
Continued awareness of the SPETSNAZ threat is necessary for making further
tangible improvements in both rear area combat doctrine and installation defense
measures.
Information courtesy of http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1986/nov-dec/boyd.html